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Vico as
Epochal Thinker

Ernesto Grassi

1.
A philosophical tradition such as Humanism is not only historically relevant for the comprehension of a given period of Western thought: Humanism is also essential if we want to become
aware of our present-day speculative situation. G. B. Vico not
only belongs to Humanism, but has indeed rethought it to its
most extreme consequences. By inverting the notion of traditional
metaphysics-as
I wish to demonstrate in this paper-did
the
great Neapolitan thinker succeed in legitimizing a new ~pproach
to the religious problem? As a staunch believer in metaphorical
thinking as the primary instance of speculation, and an enemy of
traditional ontological metaphysics, where does Vico stand in relation to Heidegger's negation of onto-theological metaphysics?
Insofar as the reappraisal of Humanist thought is concernedwhich is also a topic implicit in this paper-one needs be familiar
with, in Vico's own words, the boriadei dotti [the scholar's conceit]
of German idealist and existential metaphysics, which has always
denied that the Humanist tradition may have had any speculative
[Translatedfrom the Italian by Roberta PiazzaJ
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importance for the proper understanding of the passion behind
such a problematic. Let us not forget that it was Hegel who asserted that "philosophy has survived as a special instance of the
German nation" [dass sie in der deutschen nation als eine Eigentuehmlichkeitsich erhaltenhat], adding: "We have received this supreme profession from nature" [Wir haben den hoehren Beruf von

der Natur erhalten].1
This is very much in line with the answer Heidegger gave
me when, in handing me the Letter on Humanism for publication
(1947), he refused to give me another manuscript of a purely
speculative character, saying: "This is a German concern" ["Nein,

das ist eine deutscheAngelegenheit"].
But let us get back to Vico. A striking feature of this thinker
is that his philosophy is not grounded on any aprioriconception,
but rather on the expression of reality in its concrete historicity.
This element differentiates Vico not only from old traditional
metaphysics and Medieval speculation, but also from modern
thought beginning with Descartes. However, we would not be
dealing thoroughly and in depth with Vico' s thought if we started
with the statement that the New Scienceis "new" simply because
it starts out with the issue of history. It is necessary to investigate
how, where, and in relation to what that history originates. Is it
determined by "Divine Providence"-as
Vico affirms-so that his
theory of history takes root in a religious conception of reality?
The starting point in Vico's speculative thought is not the
traditional issue of the rational identification of beings or entities,
whether subjects or objects, but the problem of the word, specifically the question of the ingenious, fantastic word. The German
tradition, with its tendency to apriori thinking, was unable to
comprehend and fully appreciate Vico's humanistic speculation.
In my opinion, Heidegger is the only thinker who could have
shed some light on Vico. Unfortunately, blinded by the traditional
interpretation of Humanism as essentially a form of Platonism
and Neoplatonism, Heidegger took an anti-Humanist position
without ever knowing or reading Humanist authors, in particular
Vico. 2
The epochalcharacter of Vico' s main thesis lies in the notion
that metaphysics should start neither with rational principles nor
with the issue of beings (as entities), but rather with the word,
the only element able to reveal human historicity. Vico's work is
a real phenomenology, that is, a description of how human reality
"appears" [phainesthai]step by step. We must also bear in mind
that Vico constantly argues with other philosophers about their
abstract deductions, thus refusing "what philosophers have
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hitherto imagined" (NS, § 666).3 The scholar's conceit [boriadei
dotti], which Vico mentions repeatedly, is the persistent belief that
all institutions and human attitudes have their foundations in a
rational metaphysic and that, moreover, knowledge is hidden
behind myths, fables, and folktales. On the contrary, as will be
shown presently, myth itself in its ingenious origins is the primary
expression of knowledge. Hence Vico denies that Homer was a
philosopher who simply disguised speculation under the veil of
poetry. All of Homer's fantastic thinking and writing is not an
allegory of an ahistorical truth, but is rather the act of unveiling
reality in relation to a concrete historical situation. What we have
here is the negation of the Medieval notion of allegory: "We denied
that he [Homer] was ever a philosopher" (NS, § 836).
Vico firmly believes that the scholar's conceit is responsible
for the inability to properly understand the cycle of history, for
if rationality is assumed as the only philosophical criterion, then
the result is the detachment from the "necessities" of life through
which the existent manifests itself. Vico notoriously held that
academics and philosophers came last on the tree of knowledge:
First [were] the woods, then cultivated fields and huts, next little
houses and villages, thence cities, finally academies and
philosophers: this is the order of all progress from the first origins .
(NS, § 22)

2.
Vico identifies two tasks of philosophy: nature and human
activity. The former is created by God and so can only be comprehended by Him. However, up until now nature has been the
object of inquir y in traditional metaphy sics and it is precisel y thi s
ontological metaphysics that Vico refutes. The "epochal" in Vico' s
thought consists in his belief that philosophers and philologist s
should begin with a metaphysics
which seeks its proofs not in the external world but within the
modifications of the mind of him who m editates it. (NS, § 374)

Vico' s proposed metaphysics does not search for these modifications in reason but in Genius and in Fantasy, both of which render
metaphor possible; and since metaphor asserts one thing yet
meaning something else, it ends up invalidating the principles of
logic: identity, noncontradiction, and the excluded middle.
Vico's central point is to abandon a metaphysics of entities
and therefore ontology and to begin with a new one, the object
of which would be man's appearance and becoming. This ought
not to be under stood as an anthropology-which
was Heidegger's
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erroneous charge against Humanism-but
rather as the search in
relation to which human history develops (or becomes). For Vico,
what is true has no priority over what is certain, i.e., what manifests itself in its historicity. In fact, as he points out, the notion
of a fixed, rational, and ahistoric "true" proves to be false in the
long run:
It will be another great labor of this Science to recover these grounds
of truth-truth
which, with the passage of years and the changes
in languages and customs, has come down to us enveloped in
falsehood. (NS, § 150)

The counterfoisting of the true and the certain is indeed the contraposition of what claims an ahistorical universality with respect
to a rational process and what on the contrary reveals itself historically. The study of the certain is then the search for what is always
making itself evident, manifesting itself as new in reality. There
is an identity of truth and fact:
In Latin, verum (the true) and factum (what is made) are interchangeable or, in the language of the Schools, convertible terms. 4

This conception will radically transform the notion of truth, which
will no longer be identified with the rational process but with the
"unveiling" of the real in history.
Another of man's ways of "doing" [fare]things is the creating
of mathematical and geometric worlds, both of which are, however, entirely formal since they are based upon fictions, upon
unreality:
Turning this defect of his mind to useful ends, he [man] then
invents for himself two things by abstraction, as they call it: the
point, which can be drawn, and the unit, which can be multiplied.
But both are fictions: for if a point is drawn it ceases to be a point,
and if a unit is multiplied it is no longer one ....
In this way he
fashions for himself a world of shapes and numbers, such as can
be contained entirely within himself, and by extension ...
he
produces an infinite number of works, because the truths he perceives within himself are infinite. (A WI, p. 54)

By identifying the true with what is made, Vico does not aspireto
a purelyformalworld, implicitly taking ante litterama critical position
against any purely formal analytical philosophy. Further on in
the same 1710 text, Vico says:
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The most certain things are those which, redressing the defects of
their origin, resemble divine knowledge in their operation, inas much as in them the true is convertible with what is made. (AW!,
p. 55)

The task is then that of searching for what is not formal in history,
for it is there that human capacity is realized. Vico's famous thesis
is that in the darkness of night in which humanity was originally
enwrapped there appeared an eternal light, that is, the civil world
made by men. How, one might ask at this point, does history
come about? Is history initiated by Divine Providence? Are we
dealing with a new approach to the problem of religion independent of any onto-theological metaphysics?
In interpreting Vico's thought, the starting point is the concept
of necessity. In order to deal with its urgency, Vico posits the role
of Genius as the primary ability to see "what is alike" [simile]and
as such the origin of ingenious thinking and speaking:
And since naturally the discovery or invention of things comes
before criticism of them, it was fitting that the infancy of the world
should concern itself with the operation of the human mind, for
the world then had need of all inventions for the necessities and
utilities of life, all of which had been provided before the
philosophers appeared ....
(NS, § 699)

Such are the necessitieswhich were time after time originally perceived as divine commands due to their urgency, and from which
Vico goes on to extract a natural theogony. It is here that Vico's
"New Critical Art" originates, expressed in the following terms:
And here, by the principles of this new critical art, we consider at
what determinate times and on what particular occasions of human
necessity or utility felt by the first men of the gentile world, they,
with frightful religions which they themselves feigned and believed
in, imagined first such and such gods and then such and such
others. (NS, § 7)

This originary knowing is theological because
the crudest gentile humanity thought that all institutions necessary
or useful to the human race were deities. (Ibid.)

From this sterns our need to see and investigate closely the structure of ingenious and inventive thought, in which the act of finding
(actually, rediscovering: ritrovare)precedes the act of judging.
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3.
In On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians Takenfrom the Origins
of the Latin Language [De Antiquissima ... ] Vico defines ingenium5
as follows:
Ingenium is the power of connecting separate and diverse elements.
The Latins described it as acutum [acute] or obtusum [obtuse] .
. . .Thus, when obtuse, ingenuity links different things more slowly;
when acute, it does so more swiftly. (AWI, p. 70)

In the Vindiciaehe holds that
acuteness of genius . . . moves and joins, in a common relation
with a latent truth, things which to the many (volgo) appeared to
be so different and far from one another. (Opere, p. 928)

The theory of ingenium with its originary function, together
with the priority of ingenious and subtle thinking and speaking,
can only be fully comprehended from the perspective of a Topica
of sensation, that is to say, in relation to those urgencies and
needs which are met in the same process that generates the variety
of worlds. Ingenious activity can thus be described as the response
to necessita[necessity]. The originary Topicais sensitive and inventive because it is through our senses that originary needs manifest
themselves.
Now ingenious activity is originarily expressed through myth.
Logic, according to Vico, derives from logos, which means word,
speech, allowing the thinker to go back to the Greek term muthos,
which in turn refers to the word as a dumb deictic sign created
to meet natural needs. Thus logic has nothing rational in its origin.
As Vico says in the New Science:
"Logic" comes from logos, whose first and proper meaning was
fabula, fable, carried over into Italian as favella, speech. In Greek
the fable was also called mythos, myth, whence comes the Latin
mutus, mute. For speech was born in mute times as a mental [or
sign] language ... [which] existed before vocal or articulate [language]; whence logos means both word and idea. (NS, § 401)

Mythology, in turn, is the project of a tale, a fable in which action
becomes meaningful as praxis, a story in relation to which institutions and characters find their model, the universal and the various
genres for the different individuals. With the project inherent in
myth, the necessity of place and time is modified accordingly:
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myth-to which a religious meaning is attached-is not outside
history at all. Rather, it expresses the historicity of each single
different era which continually strikes us with the wondrous revelation of always dissimilar worlds. Myth is an allegory, a metaphor
not representative of an "other" world outside of history, but
rather it is the metaphor for what is realized in history.
Myth itself is a universal because in relation to myth the
particular is determined under a time-marking urgency: the project
of myth reveals the various ideals - Vico's "fantastic universals"as those different ideas to which one must conform: a continually
changing ideal of courage (for instance: Achilles), oflove, patience,
and justice. In the project of myth, individuals come to life under
a "genre" which is not rational, hence not abstractly fixed upon
a world of ahistorical ideas. In the mythical world, institutions
are not rational deductions, but rather belong to the tale which
corresponds to the needs of the "here" and "now."
When, on the contrary, myth and fantastic universals crystallize, i.e., become frozen and static and claim at the same time to
bear a meaning beyond the boundaries of history - when they
become "rational" -then the attitudes that correspond to them
become dogmatic and are no longer representative of natural
needs. Myth and the world it expresses tumble down at this point,
followed by a time of renewed barbarity with its load of sorrow,
tragedy, and suffering. Vico says, in fact, that
Mythologies, as their name indicates, must have been the proper
languages of the fables; the fables being imaginative class concepts, 6
as we have shown, the mythologies must have been the allegories
corresponding to them . . . signifying the diverse species or the
diverse individuals comprised under these genera. So that they must
have a univocal signification connoting a quality common to all
their species and individuals (as Achilles connotes an idea of valor
common to all strong men, or Ulysses an idea of prudence common
to all wise men). (NS, § 403) [emphasis added]

The fantastic universal [imaginative class concept in the Bergin-Fisch translation of the New Science]is endowed not only with
the role of striking the imagination, but also with that of showing
how a situation should be faced, in concrete terms. In other words,
fantastic universals are genres which include their species; they
are not isolated in and by themselves but arise within a given
situation expressing itself by means of a fable or a myth. If history
begins with fantastic universals, that is to say, with metaphorssuch as Godfrey, a metaphor for captain-and
if, owing to its
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concrete character, the fantastic universal must appear in a finite
story (one which begins and ends in itself), then it is always
fabulous. And if Vico persists in asserting that fantastic universals
are determined by naturalinecessita[natural necessities], then their
cogency is the source of myth and history:
The poetic characters, in which the essence of the fables consists,
were born of the need of a nature incapable of abstracting forms
and properties from subjects. Consequently they must have been
the manner of thinking of entire peoples, who had been placed
under this natural necessityin the times of their greatest barbarism.
(NS,§ 816)

Myth portrays people, heroes, characterson a grand "representational" scale, so that the praxis of myth expresses an exemplary
order . Vico reminds us that: "person" [persona]means nothing
more than "mask" [maschera]and that such a word does not derive,
as it is often believed, from pers6nare,but from personari,
a verb which we conjecture meant to wear the skins of wild beasts,
which was permitted only to heroes ....
The poets clothe their
heroes in these pelts, and above all Hercules .... To such an origin
... is to be trac ed ... the Italian application of the term personaggi,
personages, to men of high station and great representations. (NS,
§ 1034)

Myth determines praxis which is inclusive of a beginning, a development, and an end. Praxis, then, does not mean an action
carried out for the purpose of achieving something else (poiesis),
but to express through action attitudes and "characters" which
disclose an order. On this basis, Vico maintains that ancient jurisprudence was a severe form of theological poetry, a serious poem
which the Romans used to perform at the forum.

4.
In order to explore further Vico's notion of myth, perhaps
we can turn to Aristotle, who formulates his version of what myth
is together with the definition of tragedy in the Poetics. Aristotle
accurately lists six constitutive moments of tragedy (Poetics1449
b 49):
1. Staging [kosmos opseos], which is the visual world in which the

action takes place
2. Rhythm
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The word [Lexis]
The spirit of the characters [ethos]
The ideas
Myth, that is, the fable or the story itself

Aristotle explicitly says that only myth can represent the praxis of
tragedy, and not thought, characters, or words . Moreover, Aristotle's definition of tragedy is mimesis tes praxeos(1448 a 1). So, if
myth is the essence of tragedy and tragedy the imitation of praxis,
then one needs to be familiar with Aristotle's notion of praxis
based on two radically different forms of action: poiesisand praxis.
The former aims to reach an external target and is over once it
achieves the desired result: the act of building a house becomes
useless the very moment the house is built. This act then is poietic
because it is only a way of carrying out something which is not
an end in itself, but concerns something else. As he writes in the

Metaphysics:
Those actions that end with the attainment of the purpose are never
really an end but only a means to attain an end ... therefore they
cannot be recognized as praxis ...
as authentic praxis can be
considered only those actions whose end is contained within itself.
(Metaphysics, 1048 b 18)

Now if we turn to the Poetics, we find the following assertion:
We have established that a tragedy is the imitation of an action
which is whole and complete (tragodian teleias kai hole s praxeos
einai mimesin) and also a certain size (echouses ti megethos) ....
"Whole" means having a beginning, a middle, and an end. The
beginning, while not necessarily followed by something else, is,
by definition, followed by something else. The end, on the contrary,
follows something else by definition . . . but nothing else comes
after it. (Poetics, 1450 b 21 [G. M. A. Grube trans.])

Myth, which is the foundation and essence of tragedy, is therefore
a story, a fable with a beginning, a middle, and an end, beyond
which there is nothing else; it is a whole, a development that is
fully enclosed within itself. Being the tale of an action, of praxis,
myth is different from the poietic act carried out in order to realize
something else. On the contrary, myth is the manifestation and
revelation of a world with an end in itself, with its own ideas,
characters, beginning, and end: a concluded system.
The belief that historical principles are not rational but mythical and fabulous determines the epochalaspect of Vico's thought
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vis-a-vis traditional metaphysics as well as Cartesian rationalism
and German idealist metaphysics. "The first sages of the Greek
world were the theological poets," says Vico in the New Science
(§ 199), and immediately after that: "All barbarian histories have
fabulous beginnings" (NS, § 202), where fabulous is here understood precisely in the sense of theological poetry. The earliest
wise men were the theological poets because they created myths
in which the story expressed the needs of a given historical period.
Owing to its metaphoric character, this theology is actually poetry:
Now this is the threefold labor of great poetry: 1) to invent sublime
fables suited to the popular understanding; 2) to perturb to excess,
with a view to the end proposed; and 3) to teach the vulgar to act
virtuously, as the poets have taught themselves. (NS, § 376)
The epochal aspect of Vico' s thought becomes even more apparent
in the following passage:
[Because] as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all
things by und erstanding them [homointelligendo fit omnia], this imaginative metaphysics [metafisica fantasticata] shows that man becomes all things by not understanding them [homo non intelligendo
fit omnia]; and perhaps the latter proposition is truer than the
former, for when man understands he extends his mind and takes
in the things, but when he does not understand he makes the
things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself
into them. (NS , § 405)

If metaphor and myth express natural needs, then metaphoric
language, rich in fantastic elements, is originary and precise, unlike the abstruse language of rational metaphysics, which gets
entangled with and lost in the web of abstract ahistorical concepts.
We can then say, with Vico, that
languages are more beautiful in proportion as they are richer in
these condensed heroic expressions; that they are more beautiful
because they are more expressive; and that because they are more
expressive they are truer and more faithful. And that on the contrary, in proportion as they are more crowded with words of unknown origin (that is, with abstract, rational and ahistorical words),
they are less delightful [dilettevoli],because obscure and confused,
and therefore more likely to deceive and lead astray. (NS, § 445)
From this stems the notion of Topics, understood as the art of
inventing, of finding, of "coming-to" or "coming-forth" [Italian:
invenire],which, for Vico, was entirely based upon the senses and
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aimed at inventing but not arbitrarily rather to copewith necessity :
"In those earliest of times men needed to come up with [ritrovare]
all the things necessary to human life" (NS, § 497). This language is
fantastic and not arbitrary because it arises out of myth, and myth
responds to necessity. Yet,
the grammarian s, encountering great numbers of words which give
confused and indistinct ideas of things, and not knowing their
origins ... ha ve given peace to their ignorance by setting up the
universal maxim that articulate human words have arbitrarysignifications(che le voci umane articolate significanoaplacito]. (NS,§ 444)

Vico makes the radical distinction between genius [ingenium]and
reason, invention and judgment by asserting that knowledge is
acquired by means of the first term, and by adding that no invention is given without judgment, nor is judgment possible without
invention (cf. AWI, p. 72). In other words, if genius discovers
similarities and relations "here" and "now," it paves the way for
the rational process which in turn draws consequences from inventive discovery and allows the construction of a valid world within
the boundaries of that discovery. Hence the theory of genius
[ingenium]does not exclude the rational process at all. Indeed, the
rational world acquires its validity solely in the historical context
revealed by inventiveness [ingenium].When "invention" and "discovery" are no longer valid, the rational world based on that very
"discovery" falls apart. Using Heidegger rather that Vico, it can
be said that ingenium is the memory of Being.

5.
All traditional metaphysics before and after Vico, preceding
and following Humanism, up to Heidegger, starts with the issue
of beings [enti] and abstract ahistorical principles, and ends up
with onto-theo-logical metaphysics. The New Scienceis new because
it does not stud y nature but rather human becoming, and poses
the problem of what it is that "discloses" human historicity. Both
the humanistic tradition and Vico begin their philosophical investigation with customs and rituals such as religion, marriage, and
the burial of the dead, which are intrinsically human. Vico's problem is to identify right at the origin these attitudes; most important ,
however, is the word and, more precisely, the "fantastic" word.
The word is born out of necessity: poetic locution must have
begun
by a necessity of human nature ... just as, by the same necessity,
the fables, or imaginative universals [universalifantastici], arose be-
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fore the rational or philosophic universals, which were formed
through the medium of prose speech. (NS, § 460)

It appears, then, that for Vico man's needs for understanding
were taken care of by myths and stories before the rational prose
of the philosophers made their appearance. And it follows from
this that the activity of judging, of inferring an order and of systematizing a world and its institutions come after invention and
ingenious, fantastic discovery.
By the same token, linguistic differences are not arbitrary,
but are triggered by different necessities:
For by virtue of the aforesaid diversity of their natures they
[peoples] have regarded the same utilities or necessities of human
life from different points of view, and there have thus arisen so
many national customs, for the most part differing from one another
and at times contrary to one another; so and not otherwise there
have arisen as many different languages as there are nations. (NS,
§ 445)

In his conception of history - which entails a passage from
the metaphysics of beings (entities) to the metaphysics of action
and human praxis-Vico's main concern is the problematic of
whether and how it is possible to envisage a new way to deal
with the issue of religion. To this purpose, he advances the thesis
of Divine Providence, which manifests itself in and through history, and which moreover leaves out Epicurean chance and historical fate. Vico does not start out from ontology but from philology,
where the latter is understood as man's primary response to his
needs in a concrete situation. By reinterpreting philosophy and
philology, one discovers "the design of an ideal eternal history
traversed in time by the histories of all nations" (NS, § 7). Vico
holds that languages and literature (letters) are contemporary to
each other, so literature cannot be thought of as a purely "literary"
function, but rather as if endowed with the capacity and the task
of unveiling the characteristic features of language. This explains
Vico' s protest against the philologists who
have believed that among the nations languages first came into
being and then letters, whereas ... letters and languages were
born twins and proceeded apace through all their three stages.
(NS, § 33)

Thus Vico insists that in order to study the problem of Divine
Providence one needs to investigate the problem of the word,

ERNESTO GRASSI

85

as even now we may observe in peasants and other crude men,
who in conflicts between words and meanings obstinately say that
their right stands for them in the words. And this counsel of divine
providence to the end that the gentiles, not yet capable of universals
... might be led by this very particularity of their words to observe
the laws universally. (NS, § 38)

As a result, Vico emphasizes not the ahistorical abstraction of the
true [il vero],but the certain [ii certo], that is, the historical manifestation of reality in its historicity:
The first gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of nature,
were poets, who spoke in poetic characters. (NS, § 34)

The preeminence
and Horace:

of poetry is affirmed with references to Virgil

Virgil uses the word [viri] emphatically in that sense at the beginning of his Aeneid: "Arma virunque cano" (Of arms I sing and the
hero); and Horace, Ad. Pis. 141, translates the first verse of the
Odyssey: "Die mihi, Musa, virum" (Of the man, 0 Muse, sing to
me). (NS, § 657)

It is crucial, then, to bear in mind the Latin tradition which,
for instance, Heidegger overlooked when he affirmed the originary function of poetry. Heidegger preferred to limit himself solely
to Holderlin, Trakl, and George, thus ignoring the humanistic
tradition, which was thus excluded from the whole issue of the
founding role of poetry.
The question to address at this point is whether Divine Providence is embedded in the word. Before we can answer the
question, let us see a practical example of how Vico uses poetic
metaphor to assert the priority of poetry as the determining factor
in men's historical world. The God of Poetry, Apollo, desires
Daphne and pursues her. In her attempt to escape, Daphne transforms herself into a laurel bush and so becomes mankind's
genealogical tree. The divine Apollo then becomes incarnate
through history. In Vico's words:
Apollo begins this history by pursuing Daphne, a vagabond maiden
wandering through the forests (in the nefarious life); and she, by
the aid she besought of the gods ... on standing still is changed
to a laurel (a plant which is ever green in its certain and acknowledged offspring), in the same sense in which the Latins use stipites
for the stocks of families; and the recourse of barbarism brought
back the same heroic phraseology, for they call genealogies trees,
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and the founders they call stocks or stems, and the descendan ts
branches, and the families lineages. (NS, § 533)

If poetry as an ingenious activity is an originary form which allows
one to relate to and cope with natural necessity by finding
similarities, it is also by virtue of this capacity that it transforms
reality, "as a demonstrated necessity of nature" (cf. NS, § 34).
Therefore:
Apollo is alwa ys young (just as the life of Daphne, changed to a
laurel, is alwa ys verdant), for Apollo, through the names of the
great houses, makes men eternal in their families. (NS§ 538)

6.
Vico' s basic thesis on this point is that history is not created
by men as such , but is rather determined by a superior order to
which all human beings are subject: hence any anthropological
perspective is absent from Vico's thought. Men are persons not
by themselves but only in relation to whether they abide or not
by that order. The New Science identifies this order in Divine Providence, and in this sense Vico' s work reveals his religious intention. Basically, Vico essays to overcome both the Stoics' thesis,
according to which fate determines history, and the Epicurean
philosophy, according to which human becoming is subject only
to chance. It follows then, that
in this other principal aspect, this Science is a history of human
ideas through which it seems that the metaphysics of the human
mind must proceed; and in accordance with the axiom that "science s
must begin with the times in which their subject matter begins, "
this queen of sciences must begin with the times in which the first
men began to think humanly and not with those in which
philosophers began to reflect upon human ideas. (NS§ 347; Pompa
trans.)

To this end, Vico asserts that such a science must be a historical
demonstration of Providence and that, moreover,
it must be a history of the institutions by which, without human
discernment or counsel, and often against the designs of men,
providence has ordered this great city of the human race. For
though this world has been created in time and particular, the
institutions established therein by providence are universal and
eternal. (NS, § 342)
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In other words, the historical cycle in its decay and ruin is determined by the human absence of an answer to natural needs-to
"necessita naturali," as Vico calls them-i.e., by withdrawing from
the hie et nunc of necessity. This is the moment when words become
abstract and ahistorical, writing no longer corresponds to any real
urgency, men fall into barbarism and the grip of rationality, and
the world built on these principles falls irreparably into ruin due
to dogmatization. This is the barbarity of rationality and the end
of an epoch, for
the nature of our civilized minds is so detached from the senses,
even in the vulgar, by abstractions corresponding to all the abstract
terms our language abounds in, and so refined by the art of writing,
and as it were spiritualized by the use of numbers, because even
the vulgar know how to count and reckon, that it is naturally
beyond our pow er to form the vast image of this mistress called
"Sympathetic Nature." (NS,§ 378)

It cannot be denied that, even in the barbarous age of rationality, men resort to fantasy. However, they can no longer recognize
its primary or founding function, and so they only deploy fantasy
as an external substitutive tool to activate the functioning of rational concepts on the passions, thus reaching where the rational
process cannot:
For when we wish to give utterance to our understanding of spiritual
things we must seek aid from our imagination to explain them and,
like painter s, form human images of them. (NS, § 402)

But if poetry is the founding element of humanity-as
Vico asserts-then it is in poetry where our search should begin to find
Divine Providen ce. However, how and on what basis can one
speak of Divine Providence if the philosopher himself maintains
that poetic language corresponds to "natural necessities" (NS,
§ 34)?
All of Vico' s philosophy aims to prove how eternal civil history
establishes an order through the theory of genius, fantasy, and
the metaphysical word, a natural providence that sets the artificial
fires of the various cultures, the theological myths and the different
institutions which light up the dark night in which man has slumbered: Man is walled up in history. The necessity from which
history springs forth is, in its originarity, natural and abysmal; it
cannot be deduced rationally. Any new approach to religious
thought is blocked even against Vico's own intentions.
Vico writes that in their originally nefarious state men "in
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despair of nature's succors desired something superior to nature
to save them" (NS, § 385). But it is impossible to infer from his
premises the longing for this something superior to nature that
could save the savage men. Once "in the despair of nature's succors," men find only history, the urgency to move on through
history and nothing that can go beyond history: frightened by
lightning and terrified by storms during barbarian times, the only
order that appeared was the inexorable continuity of history within
which man arose, lived, and perished.
But there's another point which is essential to make: all
Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Christian thought is informed by the
preoccupation to save the individual, his sorrows, labors, and
despair. Running counter to his own intentions, Vico's model
does not provide an approach to such a conception. The "necessity
of nature" which gives life to the various worlds and is the cause
of their birth, flourishing, and extinction in the eternal order of
history pays no mind to the individual but only to its own revelation, even in its destructive stage. So, then, why is this alogic
abysmal nature called "divine"? In the ordering of eternal history
the wisdom of nature is really only interested in saving the species,
with little or no regard for the individual. History in fact reveals
the continuity of generations, not the saving of the individual or
his solace. Such considerations entail man's condemnation of history and the implacable nature which regards the individual only
inasmuch as he contributes to the realization of history. The parenthesis between birth and death resembles a theater, a series of
scenes with characters who come to life and act and then die after
going through tragic and irreversible displacements. In the time
span between birth and death there appears the terrible consciousness of death, the unheard-of awareness of self, of one's own
sorrow and hope, of our continuous separation from objects,
people, and the ephemeral instant: it is the consciousness of the
tragic aspect of our nonreligious epoch.
If the actor on the stage exists in relation to the tale, to the
myth that has been defined here as a closed narrative structure
with its beginning, development, and end, beyond which nothing
follows; and if drama imitates praxis, that is to say, an action
which, different from poiesis, does not exist for an external purpose, then it follows that, using the Cartesian formula, the actorwho is a man-can maintain not that "I think therefore I am" but
"I die therefore I am." What is disclosed between birth and death
is the terrifying consciousness of death, that is, the unheard-of
consciousness of one's own self, one's own pain and hope and

ERNESTO GRASSI

89

the continuous detachment from reality.
Vico in recent historical times and before him such prePlatonic thinkers as Sophocles and Heraklitos have perceived and
expressed in their works the tragic character of existence. I think
it is fitting to end these remarks with a passage from Ungaretti:
The facts are nevertheless clear and inexorable: there's the bygone
illusion of a European culture and the proof of reason's impotence
to save anything; there's science, lethally wounded in its moralistic
ambitions and dishonored, as it were, by the cruelty of its manifestations. 7

From this sterns the appropriateness of the doubt that to be consigned to the human condition is really a divine gift:
the continuous dissimulation of the tragic aspect of being human
to human conscience which is reflected in order to be questioned
is very much like when an object is reflected in the sea. The object
becomes a plaything in water, a nothing. It is an ineffable emblem
which, once fixed, changes according to the moods of the monster:
a poetry of sweet disclosures, a long drawn amorous lamentation,
an apparent encountering pining away with antinomic destinies. 8

Finally it all comes down to the celebration of the miracle of poetry,
which on a different occasion Ungaretti defined as:
a mystery, which in poetry is that involuntary attraction of roots
that brings the words together in a bond beyond their meaning,
mystery perceivable in the distances of space and through time
that's given to objects and such as to bring them into view in a
plateau of forgetfulness, to be disvested even of their names and
become, impatiently, the criers of dreams ... there's no poetry if
objects, from the depth of space and night of time, cannot suddenly
recall their names and overwhelm us, dazzling and frightening us
with the beauty of their presence. At that point we are invested
with the precision of this beauty, a precision outside of human
measure which takes our breath away and all possibilities to exist
before us or any other presence. 9

1. Hegel, Works, Vol. XVIII, p. 12.
2. This problem is dicusscd at length in my Heidegger and the Question of
Renaissanceflumanism (Binghamton, NY: SUNY Medieval and Renaissance Texts
and Studies, 1983).
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3. All references to the New Scienceare to the Bergin-Fisch translation: The
New Scienceof Giambattista Vico (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1983). [Heretofore the passages quoted will be indicated in text with the abbreviation NS
followed by the paragraph numb er in this standard editio n. Tr.]
4. De Antiquissima ...
in Opere, edited by F. Nicolini, p. 248. [English
translation from "On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians Taken from the Orig ins
of the Latin Language," conta ined in Vico;SelectedWritings, edited and translated
by Leon Pompa (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1982), p. 51. Hereafter AW! .
This ed ition also contains passages from the essay 011 the Study Methods of Our
Time and selections from the New Science, whose translation has often been
preferred to the Bergin-Fisch version. Ed.]
5. [Italian: ingegno; Englis h : ge niu s, ingenuity, inventiveness, according to
context; cf. Pompa, ed ., Vico: Selected Writings, p . 69. Tr.]
6. [Generi fantastici is rendered by Leon Pompa as "imaginative genera,"
wh ich is perhaps more in tune with Vico's thou ght than Bergin-Fisch's "class
concepts." Ed.]
7. Giuseppe Ungare tti, "Testimonianza su Valery," in Vitad'un uomo, p. 637 .
8. Ibid., p. 461.
9. Ibid., "St. John Perse," pp. 651-52.

